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I. INTRODUCTION
In Gabriel v. City of Chicago, the Northern District of Illinois
held that, while pregnancy is not a per se disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' pregnancy-related problems
can be considered disabilities under the ADA.2 The holding in
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-81 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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Gabriel, however, was not unique, as many other district courts have
reached the same conclusion regarding pregnancy-related problems.3
The real question in cases such as Gabriel is whether the pregnancy-
related problem at issue constitutes a disability under the ADA. This
question requires an analysis of whether the pregnancy-related
problem is a physical impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity of the plaintiff.4
The analysis is complicated by a split in the circuits as to
whether a disability should be assessed with or without regard to
mitigating measures. 5  The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), as well as a majority of the circuits, have
stated that the disability in question should be assessed without re-
gard to available corrective measures. 6 This split presents an inter-
esting issue in terms of pregnancy-related problems: Should they be
assessed as disabilities notwithstanding the ever-advancing medical
and reproductive technologies? This Note answers that question in
the affirmative. If the availability of technologically advanced repro-
ductive medical techniques is allowed to define what is and is not a
pregnancy-related problem, the list of potential ADA-covered
disabilities may become unmanageable.7 It is much more logical, as
3. See, e.g., Darian v. University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 85-87 (D. Mass. 1997);
Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (D. Conn. 1997); Cerrato v. Durham,
941 F. Supp. 388, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); see also, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136
F.3d 854, 858-59, 863-64 (1st Cir. 1998); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 897-98
(10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999).
5. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 901 nn.7-8, for a thorough list of courts on both sides of the
mitigating (or corrective) measures debate. Compare id. at 902 (noting that the "determination
of whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity should take into
consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the individual"), with Arnold, 136
F.3d at 863 (concluding "that Congress intended a reviewing court to evaluate [a plaintiffs]
disability based on his underlying medical condition without considering the ameliorative effects
of [any] medication [or mitigating measures]").
6. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(0) (1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d
464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Arnold, 136 F.3d
at 863; Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446,
1454 (7th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa.
1997).
7. Although it will not be discussed in this Note, technology is also an important consid-
eration in terms of the ADA's mandate that "reasonable accommodations" be made for a
disabled employee. This Note simply focuses on the threshold issue of whether a person is
disabled or not under the ADA. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 495-96 (1991), for a brief discussion of
technology and its impact on reasonable accommodations.
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many of the circuits and the EEOC have found, to analyze a disability
in its unmitigated state.
This Note begins in Part II by briefly discussing the history
and purpose of the ADA. Next, it looks at the history of pregnancy
discrimination and the remedial measures available to plaintiffs.
Then, the Note turns to the ADA and discusses the current law
regarding what constitutes a disability, pregnancy-related problems
under the ADA, and the current split in the circuits regarding
mitigating measures. Part III discusses technology as a mitigating
measure, particularly in relation to pregnancy-related problems. This
section of the Note explores the consequences that may flow from a
decision to evaluate disabilities with regard to mitigating measures.
Part IV concludes by proposing that pregnancy-related problems
should not be assessed with regard to mitigating measures and
technological advances, but rather should be defined in terms of the
impairment's impact on a person's life activities.
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW UNDER THE
ADA REGARDING PREGNANCY-RELATED PROBLEMS
AND MITIGATING MEASURES
The ADA is a "federal antidiscrimination statute designed to
remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities
from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available
to persons without disabilities."8 Before delving into the law of the
ADA, it is important to understand its precursors, its legislative his-
tory, and the purpose of its enactment.
A. History and Purpose of the ADA
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ("Rehabilitation Act")9 provided similar remedies for those who
were discriminated against based upon a disability. The effectiveness
of the Rehabilitation Act is limited, however, in that it applies only to
federal contractors, federal agencies, and federal fund recipients.1O
8. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1998).
9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
10. See id. §§ 791, 793, 794. The antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
are contained in Title V. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act requires affirmative action in
employment by federal executive agencies. See id. § 791(b). Section 503 requires affirmative
action in employment by federal contractors with contracts over $10,000. See id. § 793(a).
1999] 833
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Despite its defects, including limited coverage of employers, lack of
enforcement provisions, funding problems, and ambiguous Supreme
Court interpretive decisions, 11 the Rehabilitation Act was the first
federally-legislated protection against discrimination toward people
with disabilities and, as such, represented a major step forward. 12
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA as broad legislation aimed
at providing a "clear and comprehensive national mandate" to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 3  Congress
sought to establish "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards"
for addressing such discrimination. 4 The impetus behind passing the
ADA clearly stemmed from both the failures and shortcomings of the
Rehabilitation Act and congressional findings regarding the extent of
discrimination against persons with disabilities. 5
B. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") provides
the most obvious remedial measure for women who feel they have
been discriminated against based on their pregnancies. Title VII
prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."16 It was amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA7), which made Title VII specifically appli-
cable to pregnant workers. 7 Essentially, the PDA equates pregnancy-
Finally, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires nondiscrimination by federal executive
agencies and federal grantees. See id. § 794.
11. See Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some
Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 190-91
(1992); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 475-79 (comparing the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
12. See Rains, supra note 11, at 189.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). See generally Jones, supra note 7, at 472-75, for a
summary of the ADA's "tortuous" legislative history.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(bX2).
15. See Rains, supra note 11, at 199-200. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). Congress
found that:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabili-
ties, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas
as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communi-
cation, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services.
Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1)-(2) (1994).
17. See id. § 2000e(k).
834 [Vol. 52:831
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based discrimination with discrimination on the basis of gender.18
The PDA states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... 19
The PDA clearly aspires to eliminate inequality and discrimination in
the workplace based upon pregnancy, a gender-related condition.20
Under a Title VII pregnancy discrimination case, the plaintiff
may proceed under one of two theories: disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact.21 Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff alleg-
ing pregnancy-related discrimination argues that she was treated
differently by her employer because of her pregnancy and "no bona
fide occupational qualification justified the differential treatment."22
Under the disparate impact theory, the plaintiff argues that a facially
neutral policy disproportionately burdened her as a pregnant
woman.2 While the PDA has proven fairly effective at eliminating
more egregious and explicit pregnancy discrimination in the work-
place, both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
18. See id. See also Andrew Weismann, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690, 692-93 (1983), where the author states:
Congress passed the PDA to amend [Tlitle VII so as to include explicitly pregnancy clas-
sifications within its definition of sex discrimination. The PDA establishes that preg-
nancy classifications are sex-based because the condition affects only women. The legis-
lators specifically endorsed [the view]... that the underinclusive disability programs
differentiated not between the pregnant and the nonpregnant but between those who
faced the risk of pregnancy and those who did not. Furthermore, the disability
programs, by excluding only pregnancy, still fully covered male sex-specific illnesses, but
not female sex-specific disabilities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
20. Put another way, "Title VII does not permit an employer's paternalistic notions of
how a pregnant employee should conduct her affairs to be substituted for the woman's ownjudgment.'" Martinez v. Labelmaster, No. 96 C 4189, 1998 WL 786391, at *2 (N.D. IM. Nov. 6,
1998) (quoting EEOC v. Corinth, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ind. 1993)). But see Judith
G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against
Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1998) (positing that the PDA
reinforces stereotypes of pregnant women and their ability to fully participate in the workforce).
21. See Jennifer Gottschalk, Accommodating Pregnancy on the Job, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
241, 265 (1996); D'Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the
Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1411,
1418 (1996).
22. Gottschalk, supra note 21, at 266; see also Millsap, supra note 21, at 1418.
23. See Gottschalk, supra note 21, at 267-68; Millsap, supra note 21, at 1418-19.
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present problems for pregnant women who are discriminated against
in more subtle ways.24
If a plaintiff proceeds under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination,25 the plaintiff, in the absence of explicit discriminatory
treatment, must often provide circumstantial evidence of pregnancy
discrimination.6 This can be a difficult task-if the plaintiff presents
indirect evidence of pregnancy discrimination, the employer is able to
escape liability by showing that a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son for the employment decision existed.27 Moreover, an employer
need not provide those accommodations often needed by a pregnant
woman (like frequent breaks and more flexible schedules) if those
accommodations are not provided to other workers as well.28 In other
words, if the employer denies those accommodations to all workers,
the employer cannot be held liable to a pregnant woman under a dis-
parate treatment analysis.
It would seem that a plaintiff might be more successful in a
PDA suit by proceeding under the disparate impact theory.29 PDA
suits alleging disparate impact, however, are rarely successful.
Moreover, several Supreme Court cases have limited the applicability
of disparate impact theory to pregnant women.30
A critical difference between the PDA and the ADA is their
stated purposes. The PDA's main purpose is to facilitate equality
between the sexes in the workplace, while the ADA's main purpose is
to eliminate discrimination based on disability. The two statutes
24. See Millsap, supra note 21, at 1419.
25. In order to prove a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected classification; (2) the plaintiff is qualified for the
job; (3) the employer rejected the plaintiff for the position despite the plaintiffs qualifications for
the job; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of plaintiffs qualifications or the employer filled the position with someone from a
nonprotected group. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also
Millsap, supra note 21, at 1418 n.31.
26. See Gottschalk, supra note 21, at 266; Millsap, supra note 21, at 1419-20.
27. See Millsap, supra note 21, at 1420. See id. at 1418-21, for a detailed discussion on the
advantages and disadvantages of proceeding under a disparate treatment theory under the
PDA.
28. See Gottschalk, supra note 21, at 266-67.
29. One author has argued that the disparate impact theory is more likely than disparate
treatment theory to serve as a means of achieving on-the-job accommodations. See id. at 267-
68. The author also noted, however, that it is not entirely clear that disparate impact theory is
available to PDA plaintiffs. See id. at 267.
30. See Millsap, supra note 21, at 1422. See id. at 1422-23 for an analysis of the relevant
Supreme Court decisions, California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987), and Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, 479 U.S. 511 (1987), and
their effect on PDA plaintiffs alleging disparate impact. See also Gottschalk, supra note 21, at
268.
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overlap, however, when a pregnancy is perceived as a disability, or a
pregnancy-related problem actually is or is perceived as a disability.
While one of the purposes of the ADA is to eliminate disability-
based discrimination in the workplace, the ADA also mandates that
"reasonable accommodations" be made for the disabled worker.31 The
PDA does not attempt to ease the burden of the pregnant woman in
the workplace. One commentator has explained this difference by
stating that "[t]he PDA does not grant a pregnant employee the af-
firmative power to demand accommodation in the workplace, but
instead limits her to the negative right to be treated the same as
other similarly situated workers."32
C. Relevant Law of the ADA
The ADA consists of five titles.33 This Note will focus on Title I
of the ADA, the employment discrimination provision, as this is the
section under which pregnancy-related problems are usually liti-
gated.34 Title I prohibits employment discrimination "against a quali-
fied individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
31. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of 'Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 585 (1998), for
a discussion of how the ADA differs from other anti-discrimination statutes in terms of mandat-
ing affirmative action on the part of the employer. See also Millsap, supra note 21, at 1430.
32. Millsap, supra note 21, at 1417.
33. Title I addresses employment in the private sector and is applicable to private schools
and colleges. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Title I1 prohibits discrimination by public enti-
ties, both as employers and as providers of services. See id. § 12132. Title Ill applies to public
accommodations in buildings and transportation services. See id. § 12182(a). Title IV addresses
telecommunications services for hearing-impaired and speech-impaired individuals. See 47
U.S.C. § 225 (1994). Title V covers miscellaneous provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994); see
also Jones, supra note 7, at 481-89 (discussing the five titles of the ADA); Albert S. Miles et al.,
The Reasonable Accommodations Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, WEST'S
EDUC. L. REP., Oct. 1991, at 1, 4 (same).
34. While Title I of the ADA provides the most frequent basis of litigation for pregnancy-
related problems as disabilities, several women have filed suits under Title H, the public enti-
ties provision of the ADA. See generally Darian v. University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77
(D. Mass. 1997); Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1997); Garrett v.
Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, No. 95 C 7341, 1996 WL 411319 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 1996).
Darian and Garrett both involved students who were unable to complete their coursework due
to pregnancy-related problems. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 82-84; Garrett, 1996 WL 411319, at *2.
In these cases, the use of Title H is appropriate because it is not an employment discrimination
action and the schools were public entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. However, in Hernandez, the
plaintiff sued her employer, a public entity, under Title I. Hernandez, 959 F. Supp. at 127-28.
The court suggested that filing under Title I of the ADA may have been more appropriate as
Title I explicitly addresses discrimination in all employment situations, whether public or
private. See id.
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ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
35
A "covered entity" is defined by the ADA as "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization or joint labor-management
committee."36 A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined by
the ADA as "an individual with a disability who, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."37 In order
to state a prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title
I of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she38 is "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified, with or without reason-
able accommodation, for the job at issue; and (3) the employer dis-
criminated against her based upon her alleged disability.39 While all
three requirements are usually litigated within the context of an ADA
employment discrimination case, the topic of this Note implicates only
the first requirement-that the plaintiff be disabled.
The first burden the plaintiff must overcome is demonstrating
that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.4° The ADA de-
fines a disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi-
vidual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment."41 Although individuals who qualify un-
der any of the prongs are considered disabled, in cases involving
pregnancy-related problems, most ADA plaintiffs fall under the first
prong of the definition.42
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
36. Id. § 12111(2).
37. Id. § 12111(8).
38. This Note will use the feminine pronoun throughout because the cases involve preg-
nancy-related problems.
39. See Washington v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1998); Harris
v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1996); Hernandez v. City of Hartford,
959 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Conn. 1997); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F.
Supp. 465, 472 (D. Kan. 1996), affd, 158 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998). Other courts have listed
the requirements of a prima facie case under Title I of the ADA as requiring plaintiff to prove
that (1) she was "disabled" as that term is defined by the ADA; (2) she was qualified, with or
without accommodation, to do the job; (3) she was discharged; and (4) she was replaced by a
non-disabled person. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Usera v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 967 F. Supp. 35, 38
(D.P.R. 1997). These requirements are directly modeled after the standards set forth for a
prima facie showing of employment discrimination in disparate treatment Title VII cases as
enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Vallejo Serrano
v. Cigna Insurance Co., 970 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.P.R. 1996), for a list of courts applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA cases.
40. See Washington, 152 F.3d at 467.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
42. See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Those cases that have
addressed whether pregnancy fits within this definition have focused exclusively on the first,
838 [Vol. 52:831
1999] TECHNOLOGYAS A PANACEA 839
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court refined the definition
of disability into the following inquiries:
First, we consider whether [plaintiffs pregnancy-related problems were] a
physical impairment. Second, we identify the life activity upon which
[plaintiffi relies.., and determine whether it constitutes a major life activity
under the ADA. Third, tying the two statutory phrases together, we ask
whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity.43
The text of the ADA does not define "physical or mental im-
pairment," "substantially limits," or "major life activities." However,
Congress authorized the EEOC to promulgate regulations interpret-
ing the ADA." In response to this authority, the EEOC issued regula-
tions defining the various statutory phrases. 45
objective prong of the definition."); see also Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979
(N.D. Il1. 1998) (discussing when pregnancy may be considered a disability); Lacoparra v.
Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (analyzing pregnancy under
the first prong of the definition); Darian v. University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 85 (D.
Mass. 1997) (deciding whether pregnancy is a physical impairment under the ADA); Hernandez,
959 F. Supp. at 129-30 (same); Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 472 (same); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit
Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (same); Tsetseranos v. Tech
Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995) (same); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.
(Pacourek 1), 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. IlM. 1994) (same). In cases involving pregnancy-
related problems, very few plaintiffs attempt to argue that they are also disabled under the
third prong of the disability definition-that their employers regarded them as disabled. See
Lacoparra, 982 F. Supp. at 228-29.
43. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998).
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (1994).
45. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998). The EEOC regulations define "physical impairment" as
"[amny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting
one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." Id. § 1630.2(hXl).
The regulations also provide that a person with a disability is "substantially limited" if she
is:
(i) [ulnable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [she
is able to] perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
The regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for oneself, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
Id. § 1630.2(i). The Interpretive Guidance appended to the regulations confirm that this list is
"not exhaustive" and lists other major life activities such as sitting, standing, lifting, and
reaching. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). In addition, the EEOC Compliance Manual lists
thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others as major life activities. See 2 EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.3(b) (Mar. 1995), as compiled in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, at 902-15 (1998). The regulations also state that:
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D. ADA Disability Standards as They Relate to
Pregnancy-Related Problems
In order for a woman to establish her pregnancy-related prob-
lem as a disability under Title I of the ADA, she must satisfy the
ADA's definition of a disability.46 This requires a plaintiff to establish
that (1) her pregnancy-related problem is a physical impairment~v and
(2) the impairment substantially limits a major life activity, as
recognized by the ADA.48 Only the combination of these two inquiries
determines whether a particular pregnancy-related problem is a
disability. As such, this Note will refer to pregnancy-related problems
as impairments when discussing only the first inquiry and as disabili-
ties when discussing the combination of the two inquiries.
The issue of whether pregnancy-related problems qualify as
disabilities has been litigated frequently over the past decade. Courts
appear to analyze the issue of pregnancy-related problems under the
ADA in one of three ways.49
[t]he following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) [tihe nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) [tihe duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) tlhe permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX2)i)-(ii). Finally, the EEOC regulations make explicit that "temporary,
non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are
usually not disabilities" for the purpose of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
46. This Note will continue to define "disability" as a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits a major life activity because this is the most frequently relied upon
definition of disability in the pregnancy-related problem cases. See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
47. In one case in which the plaintiff failed to allege a specific physical impairment related
to her pregnancy, the court found that no ADA cause of action would lie. See Horwitz v.
Sterling Miami, Inc., No. 97 C 6322, 1998 WL 245883, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1998) (finding
plaintiff must allege a specific physical impairment arising from her miscarriage).
48. In addition to the major life activities listed above, see supra note 45, the Supreme
Court recently held in Bragdon that reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA.
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. After Bragdon, plaintiffs will find it easier to assert a disability
under the ADA based upon pregnancy-related problems that affect the major life activity of
reproduction. Plaintiffs can claim that an assortment of major life activities are substantially
limited by pregnancy-related problems. This leads to a wide variety of fact-specific questions in
these cases. As a result, the major life activity affected in each case will differ depending on the
particular plaintiff and the plaintiffs particular pregnancy-related problems.
49. A fourth category of cases also exists, but it does not address pregnancy-related prob-
lems under the ADA. This category includes women who file suit under the ADA claiming that
their infertility is a disability. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. (Pacourek I), 916 F. Supp.
797, 801, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that infertility was a physical impairment that substan-
tially limited the major life activity of reproduction, rendering infertility a disability under the
ADA); Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 911 F.
Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. IMI. 1995) (same); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. (Pacourek ), 858 F. Supp.
1393, 1404-05 (N.D. M1l. 1994) (same as Pacourek II, but at dismissal stage instead of summary
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1. Always a Disability Approach
Only one court has found that pregnancy is a per se disability
under the ADA.5° Chapsky v. Baxter V. Mueuller Division found
pregnancy to be a "recognized disability."51 In Chapsky, Baxter fired
the plaintiff after her first violation of Baxter's new non-smoking
policy.52 Plaintiff alleged that Baxter utilized the new non-smoking
policy as a pretext to terminate her employment after one of her
supervisors became aware of her troubled pregnancy.53 Plaintiff
argued that proof of this dissimilar treatment could be found in the
fact that other employees had received numerous warnings regarding
the new non-smoking policy and had not been terminated after their
first infraction.5 The court found that the plaintiff had made a prima
facie showing of disability discrimination based upon the premise that
pregnancy was a per se disability and she was treated differently than
other employees who were not pregnant. 55
The holding in Chapsky is no longer defensible. First, the
court has since modified the ruling in Chapsky so that pregnancy is no
longer considered a per se disability under the ADA.56 Second, the
Chapsky ruling has been sharply criticized by other courts deciding
whether pregnancy-related problems are disabilities under the ADA.57
Third, the Chapsky court incorrectly relied on Pacourek v. Inland
Steel Co., where the court found that infertility, not pregnancy or
judgment stage). But see, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-08
(S.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activity and, hence, that infertil-
ity is not a disability under the ADA); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243-
44 (E.D. La. 1995) (same). The Supreme Court's holding in Bragdon that reproduction is a
major life activity under the ADA has put this debate to rest somewhat. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at
2205.
50. Cf. Colette G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating
Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193, 193-94 (1993) (arguing
that pregnancy should be considered a disability under the ADA and that the refusal to do so
"results from the misunderstandings surrounding'disability").
51. Chapsky v. Baxter V. Mueuller Div., No. 93-6524, 1995 WL 103299, at *3 (N.D. IMl.
Mar. 9, 1995).
52. Id. at *2-3.
53. See id. at *l-2.
54. See id. at *2.
55. See id. at *3.
56. See Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
57. See, e.g., Wenzlaff v. NationsBank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Md. 1996); Gudenkauf v.
Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473-74 (D. Kan. 1996), afftd, 158 F.3d 1074
(10th Cir. 1998); see also Richards v. City of Topeka, 934 F. Supp. 378, 382 (D. Kan. 1996)
(holding that pregnancy is not a per se physical impairment).
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pregnancy-related problems, could be a disability under the ADA.58
Finally, the ruling in Chapsky is completely contrary to the
Interpretive Guidance issued by the EEOC regarding the agency's
ADA regulations. 59
2. Never a Disability Approach
Other courts, at the other end of the spectrum, advocate disal-
lowing any recovery under the ADA for pregnant women, regardless
of pregnancy-related problems.6 0 Flaws also exist with each of these
cases, however, that prevent them from being cited for the proposition
that no pregnant woman should recover under the ADA. One of the
earliest cases disallowing recovery, Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., was
decided before ADA case law had substantially developed.61
Therefore, the Byerly court had no precedent to rely upon for a finding
that pregnancy-related problems could be disabilities under the ADA.
Also, it is not clear from the Byerly decision that the plaintiff claimed
anything more than that her pregnancy was a disability.62 As such, it
is doubtful that Byerly can be cited for the proposition that pregnant
women should never be allowed to recover under the ADA; more likely
it stands for the proposition that pregnancy is not a per se disability.
Despite Byerly's uncertain import, other courts have relied on Byerly
to deny a right to ADA protection for women experiencing pregnancy-
related problems. 63
58. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. (Pacourek 1), 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill.
1994); see also supra note 49.
59. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998). The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance for the regu-
lations promulgated for Title I of the ADA state that:
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical,
psychological, environmental, cultural and economic characteristics that are not im-
pairments. The definition of the term "impairment' does not include physical character-
istics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone
that are within the "normal" range and are not the result of a physiological disor-
der .... Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological
disorder are also not impairments.
Id.
60. See Leahr v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., No. 96 C 1388, 1997 WL 414104,
at *4 (N.D. IM. July 17, 1997) (finding that pregnancy-related problems are not disabilities under
the ADA); Johnson v. A.P. Products, Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding cases
holding that pregnancy is not a disability "more persuasive" than those holding the contrary);
Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-7382, 1993 WL 101196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1993)
(holding that the statute indicates that pregnancy is not covered by the ADA).
61. Byerly, 1993 WL 101196, at *1.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Leahr, 1997 WL 414104, at *3; Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 627.
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One flaw in Byerly and its progeny is that these cases cite the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provisions as evidence that pregnancy
and any related problems can never be disabilities.6 These guide-
lines, however, simply state that pregnancy, occurring as a natural
result of a healthy reproductive system, should not be considered as
an impairment per se.65 The guidelines conclude nothing about preg-
nancy-related problems.
Two arguments appear repeatedly in cases cited for the propo-
sition that pregnancy and pregnancy-related problems can never be
disabilities under the ADA. One argument is that pregnancy-related
problems are by their nature temporary and therefore cannot be
considered disabilities under the ADA.66 Two sections of the EEOC
guidelines support the interpretation that temporary disabilities
cannot be considered disabilities under the ADA. First, the appendix
to the section defining "substantially limits" states that "temporary,
non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term
or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities."67  Also, in the
"substantially limits" definition in the guidelines, the EEOC puts
forth three factors for courts to consider when deciding whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity.68 Two of these
factors relate to duration of the impairment and/or its effects.
Courts have relied on these EEOC guidelines to conclude that
pregnancy is a temporary impairment that cannot be considered a
disability under the ADA.69 Without great explanation, these courts
have determined that pregnancy is an inherently temporary condition
because it can never extend beyond nine months. The ADA, however,
mandates a more refined analysis of this question by asking courts to
64. See Leahr, 1997 WL 414104, at *3 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998), which
states that "[o]ther conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological
disorder are also not impairments"); Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 627 (same); Byerly, 1993 WL
101196, at *4 (same).
65. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h).
66. See, e.g., Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Leahr, 1997 WL 414104, at *4; Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 627; Jessie v. Carter Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
67. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
68. See id. § 1630.2(j)(2Xii)-(iii) (stating that a court should consider 'the duration or
expected duration of the impairment" and the "permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment").
69. See, e.g., Lacoparra, 982 F. Supp. at 227 (implying that pregnancy is a temporary
condition which will not constitute a disability under the ADA); Jessie, 926 F. Supp. at 616
(stating that pregnancy is a "temporary, non-chronic condition of short duration which is not a
disability under normal circumstances" (citing Villareal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F.
Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995))).
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consider plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis.70 While it is possible that
some plaintiffs will suffer minimal to no pregnancy-related problems,
or problems that are only intermittent or purely temporary, it is also
possible that certain plaintiffs will suffer from severe pregnancy com-
plications that will prevent them from living and working as they
normally would.
Instead of a blanket assertion that pregnancy-related problems
are always temporary, some courts have determined that particular
pregnancy-related problems were not temporary and could qualify as
disabilities under the ADA. Notably, the court in Gabriel v. City of
Chicago stated that "[a]lthough intermittent, episodic impairments
are not considered disabilities under the ADA, Gabriel's condition was
not intermittent or episodic .... Her ailments began affecting her in
July 1995 and did not subside until January 1996. These ailments
extended beyond the time Gabriel gave birth . "..."71 As with other
impairments that are not pregnancy-related, the determination of
whether a particular impairment is a disability under the ADA or
simply a temporary condition is a fact-specific question and requires
close analysis of the particular plaintiffs pregnancy-related
problems.72
The other argument that courts frequently make when reason-
ing that pregnancy and pregnancy-related problems are not disabili-
ties is that there is no need to address pregnancy-related problems
under the ADA because the PDA already provides remedies for preg-
nant women who face discrimination. 73 While these courts are right
to point out that the PDA covers pregnancy-related discrimination,
the courts fail to take into account the very different purposes and
70. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
71. Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983 (N.D. Ml1. 1998) (citation omitted).
72. The question of whether a pregnancy-related problem is a per se temporary problem
has also been addressed in the context of a perceived disability (the third prong of the EEOC's
disability definition in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998)). In Martinez v. Labelmaster, No. 96 C 4189,
1998 WL 786391 (N.D. l. Nov. 6, 1998), the court held that the plaintiff could not show that the
defendant perceived the plaintiff as having a physical impairment which substantially limited a
major life activity. Specifically, the court stated that while "it is undisputed that defendants
believed the perceived 'impairment' would end when Martinez was no longer pregnant, it is also
undisputed that defendants did not expect that [the pregnancy] would result in any permanent
impact." Id. at *8-9.
73. See Villarreal, 895 F. Supp. at 152 (stating that "[tihe existence of both Title VII and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act obviate the need to extend the coverage of the ADA to protect
pregnancy and related medical conditions"); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp.
109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating that the PDA "obviates the need for pregnancy-related discrimi-
nation to also be covered under the ADA"); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A 92-7382, 1993
WL 101196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1993).
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remedies of the PDA and ADA. 74 It is because of these different
purposes and remedies that the ADA might provide the only adequate
means of redress to a pregnant worker who has experienced discrimi-
nation.
Different theoretical models underlie the PDA and ADA.
When a pregnant woman chooses to file suit under either the PDA or
the ADA, these different theoretical models may alter the remedies
available in the workplace. Legal scholars tend to discuss equality in
terms of two different models: equal treatment and special
treatment.75 The reasoning behind the equal treatment model is that
those who are alike should be treated alike and those who are not
alike should not be treated alike.76 Under this model, women and
men should be treated in a like manner, as the two sexes do not differ
in any substantial way. The special treatment model, on the other
hand, reasons that women are basically different from men and must
be treated differently in particular circumstances, like pregnancy.77
Because the ADA focuses not on gender equality but on disabil-
ity discrimination, the equal/special treatment theoretical models do
not apply. Instead, the ADA relies on a reasonable accommodations
model. At least one commentator has argued that the ADA's reason-
able accommodation model is superior to the PDA's equal/special
treatment models. 78 As stated above, the PDA can offer pregnant
women only the prospect of not being discriminated against because of
their pregnancy. The ADA, however, provides certain pregnant
women, those with pregnancy-related problems that qualify as dis-
abilities, with an affirmative right to be reasonably accommodated in
the workplace during the duration of their pregnancy-related
problems.79
3. Moderate Approach
Finally, other courts have taken a moderate approach. These
courts conclude that, while pregnancy is not a per se disability, preg-
nancy-related problems can be disabilities under the ADA. In Gabriel
v. City of Chicago, one of the most recent of these cases, the plaintiff
74. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
75. See Millsap, supra note 21, at 1424.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1424-27, for a detailed discussion of the equal and special treatment theo-
retical models as they pertain to pregnancy discrimination in the workplace.
78. See id. at 1433-35.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
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obtained work as a probationary data entry operator with the City of
Chicago Police Department in June 1995.80 In early July, Gabriel
informed her immediate supervisor that she was pregnant.81 Later
that month, Gabriel told her supervisor that she was having a
difficult pregnancy.82 Her supervisor then requested that Gabriel get
a note from her doctor confirming this.8 Gabriel submitted a note
from her doctor indicating that she was able to perform only light
work duties for the duration of her pregnancy.8 Gabriel's supervisor
honored this request and Gabriel was no longer expected to lift boxes,
pull cabinets, or carry heavy folders.8
In October 1995, Gabriel's supervisor was replaced by another
woman, Meehan. 86 Meehan was not as accommodating as Gabriel's
previous supervisor regarding her physical restrictions.8 7 Meehan
insisted that Gabriel be able to perform all the duties at the front
desk if she were to remain in her position.88 As a result of Meehan's
continued insistence and Gabriel's problems with standing and com-
pleting her job duties, Gabriel informed Meehan in November 1995
that she would be taking a leave of absence beginning in December
because of her pregnancy-related problems.89 In November, Meehan
recommended against Gabriel's promotion to permanent status, stat-
ing that Gabriel was not always ready to begin work at the scheduled
starting time, that she could not work quickly enough to keep up with
a fast-paced workload, and that she had taken several days off since
starting her job in June.90
The city then authorized Gabriel's termination on November
27, 1995, and Meehan terminated her two days later91 Five days af-
ter Gabriel's termination, Gabriel went into premature labor and gave
birth a full two months before her scheduled due date.92 Gabriel sub-
sequently filed suit against the city of Chicago.9 3 The court denied the
















city's motion for summary judgment and found that there were mate-
rial issues of fact regarding Gabriel's ADA claim.94
The court began its analysis by defining the relevant EEOC
regulations and definitions and discussing the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Bragdon v. Abbott95 The court acknowledged that while
Bragdon clarified that reproduction was a major life activity under
the ADA, it was unclear how this determination affected particular
disabilities of the reproductive system, including pregnancy-related
problems.9 The court further noted that guidance from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and other circuit
courts was visibly lacking in the area of pregnancy-related problems
under the ADA, presumably because many of these suits are brought
under the PDA97 The court engaged in a survey of the various district
court decisions addressing this issue and, in doing so, noted the
various criticisms of the Chapsky decision. 98 After reviewing the
various criticisms of Chapsky's holding, the court limited the holding
in Chapsky and pronounced that, while pregnancy was not a per se
disability under the ADA, pregnancy-related problems could
constitute disabilities under the ADA.99
In reaching its conclusion that pregnancy-related problems
could be considered disabilities under the ADA, the court followed the
Supreme Court's method of analysis established in Bragdon for de-
termining whether the plaintiff suffers from a disability, as defined by
the ADA and EEOC regulations. 1' ° The court first addressed the im-
pairment requirement and drew a distinction between pregnancy and
problems caused by pregnancy, "the latter of which may constitute
impairments if they are the product of a 'physiological disorder'-one
type of physical impairment listed in the EEOC regulations."1°1 The
94. See id. at 983.
95. See id. at 978.
96. See id. at 979.
97. See id.
98. See id. Judge Castillo decided both Chapsky and Gabriel.
99. See id. at 980. The Gabriel court also noted the various other district courts that have
determined that pregnancy-related problems may be considered disabilities under the ADA.
See, e.g., Darian v. University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 85-87 (D. Mass. 1997);
Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Conn. 1997); Cerrato v. Durham, 941
F. Supp. 388, 391-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Garrett v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, No. 95 C
7341, 1996 WL 411319, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 1996); Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp.
274, 278 (N.D. IlM. 1995).
100. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
101. Gabriel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 980. In analyzing pregnancy-related problems under the
ADA, the Gabriel court relied heavily upon the analysis of the court in Hernandez. In
Hernandez, the plaintiff filed an ADA employment suit under Title 11 of the ADA (prohibiting
discrimination by public entities), which requires substantially the same analysis as a Title I
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court insisted that impairments resulting from a physiological disor-
der would be easy to identify because current medical knowledge
allowed a clear distinction to be drawn between "normal and abnor-
mal functions of pregnancy."12 The court found that a jury could rea-
sonably find that Gabriel's pregnancy-related problems-premature
birth, swelling, and back and stomach pain-were "physiological dis-
orders of the reproductive system."103 The court continued by stating
that it could not, as a matter of law, find that Gabriel's pregnancy-
related problems were functions of a normal pregnancy.10 4
The court next addressed the major life activity requirement.
Gabriel asserted that her pregnancy-related problems substantially
limited her in the major life activity of standing.1°5 Once the court
acknowledged that standing was a major life activity, as recognized by
the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provisions,10 6 the court addressed
whether Gabriel's physical impairments substantially limited her in
that activity. In making this determination, the court acknowledged
its consideration of the three factors outlined by the EEOC.107 The
court found that "Gabriel's testimony that she could not stand for long
periods of time throughout most of her pregnancy permits a finding
that she was 'significantly restricted as to the condition, manner and
duration' of her ability to stand, as compared to the average per-
son."108
The court, having found that Gabriel's pregnancy-related prob-
lems could qualify as physical impairments which substantially lim-
ited her ability to stand, held that material issues of fact existed
relating to whether Gabriel's pregnancy-related problems could be
considered disabilities under the ADA.109 In doing so, the court
adopted the same approach utilized by other district courts, an ap-
proach that requires the court to evaluate the plaintiffs pregnancy-
related problems by determining whether the alleged problem is an
suit. Hernandez, 959 F. Supp. at 128. While employed by the city of Hartford, the plaintiff
became pregnant and developed uterine fibroids which complicated her pregnancy and re-
stricted her ability to work. See id. at 127-28. Hernandez requested to work at home and the
request was denied. See id. at 128. She subsequently filed suit. See id. The court denied the
defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that pregnancy-related problems can be dis-
abilities under the ADA if the problems are a function of an abnormal pregnancy. See id. at 130.
102. Gabriel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
103. Id. at 981-82.
104. See id. at 981.
105. See id. at 982.
106. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
107. See supra note 45.
108. Gabriel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (quoting 29 CFR § 1630.2(j(Xli) (1998)).
109. See id.
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abnormal or unusual pregnancy-related condition and whether the
impairment substantially limits a major life activity as defined by the
ADA.11o
While the Gabriel court cited numerous other district court
decisions that utilized the normal/abnormal pregnancy analysis,
many of these decisions do not discuss this distinction in any depth."1
While all of these courts hold that pregnancy is not a per se physical
impairment under the ADA,"2 many of the opinions, such as
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit
Constructors, Inc., and Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., do not de-
vote much analysis to which pregnancy-related problems would and
would not qualify under the ADA."1 The courts in Gudenkauf,
Villarreal, and Tsetseranos held, in varying language, that "pregnancy
and [its] related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circum-
stances, constitute a 'physical impairment' under the ADA.""m
Unfortunately, courts taking this approach often let this holding
stand alone without any explanation to illuminate the court's
reasoning. In other words, other courts and plaintiffs are left to de-
110. The court justified taking this approach by stating that:
Several other district courts have taken a similar approach, distinguishing between
functions of normal pregnancies on one hand, and abnormal or unusual pregnancy-re-
lated conditions on the other. These courts find that the latter may constitute impair-
ments under the ADA if they meet the EEOC's definition of physiological disorders or
impairments of the reproductive system. In making this determination, these decisions
examine the symptoms resulting from pregnancy, as opposed to focusing on the condi-
tion of pregnancy itself. The courts then ask whether the impairments resulting from
pregnancy substantially limit a major life activity .... We believe this approach is
grounded firmly in the EEOC regulations and the available medical literature.
Id. at 981.
111. There are some exceptions to this statement. The court in Cerrato v. Durham engaged
in much of the same analysis as the Hernandez and Gabriel courts, citing medical knowledge as
the beacon for distinguishing between normal pregnancy-related conditions and unusual
conditions resulting from an abnormal pregnancy. See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388,
392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Martinez v. Labelmaster, No. 96 C 4189, 1998 WL 786391, at *8
(N.D. Ml1. Nov. 6, 1998), the court held that "[i]f pregnancy itself is not an impairment for the
purposes of the ADA, it is counterintuitive to hold that a general condition of pregnancy, which
is not a medical complication with regard to plaintiffs particular pregnancy, is an impairment."
112. See, e.g., Gudenkaufv. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan.
1996), affd, 158 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but it is not
a disorder. Being the natural consequence of a properly functioning reproductive system,
pregnancy cannot be called an impairment.").
113. Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 473; Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F.
Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119
(D.N.H. 1995); see also Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213, 227-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
114. Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at 119; see also Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 473; Villarreal,
895 F. Supp. at 152.
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termine what constitutes a sufficient deviation from a "normal" preg-
nancy to establish an impairment under the ADA.
As a result of the vague holdings in these cases, other courts
have concluded that pregnant women may never recover under the
ADA. 115 This interpretation, however, appears to be a mistaken read-
ing of the courts' language. While language such as "pregnancy and
related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circumstances,
constitute a 'physical impairment' under the ADA"116 is undeniably
ambiguous, it certainly does not follow that the courts are attempting
to bar recovery under the ADA to any pregnant woman. This may
partially be explained by the fact that the plaintiffs in Gudenkauf and
Villarreal attempted to proceed with an ADA suit on the theory that
their pregnancies were disabilities."17 The only principle that these
cases establish is that plaintiffs with a pregnancy-related problem
have difficulty recovering under the ADA. The cases do not stand for
the proposition that it is impossible.
The major problem with the GabriellHernandez / Cerrato and
Gudenkauf/Villarreal/Tsetseranos lines of cases is that no court has
defined what a normal pregnancy is, what an abnormal pregnancy is,
and what might constitute unusual circumstances. As stated before,
cases such as Gabriel v. City of Chicago have attempted to engage in
some analysis regarding the normal/abnormal standard, mostly by
stating that medical science has advanced enough to draw a clear
distinction between normal and abnormal pregnancies or conditions of
pregnancy."8 Another method some courts have suggested is that in
order for a pregnancy-related problem to qualify as a physical
impairment, the problem must be attributable to some independent
115. See, e.g., Cerrato, 941 F. Supp. at 392 (citing a number of courts, including Gudenkauf,
Villarreal, and Tsetseranos, that have relied upon 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998) to conclude
that a "pregnant woman can never claim the protection of the ADA").
116. Villarreal, 895 F. Supp. at 152.
117. See Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 473-74; Villarreal, 895 F. Supp. at 152. The
Tsetseranos decision is more complicated because in that case the plaintiff argued that ovarian
cysts complicated her pregnancy. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiffs ADA claim, stating that "[alithough plaintiffs pregnancy was clearly
complicated by her ovarian cysts, and these complications required her to be out of work for a
period of time, the court finds that plaintiffs pregnancy was not a 'disability' under the ADA."
Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at 119. The court went on to say that "even assuming that plaintiffs
pregnancy and ovarian cyst problem constitute a disability under the ADA, the court
finds ... that plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to establish a causal nexus between
her disability and defendant's decision to terminate her." Id. In this way, the Tsetseranos court
was able to dodge the question of whether the plaintiffs ovarian cyst-complicated pregnancy
should be a physical impairment under the ADA.
118. See Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-81 (N.D. IlM. 1998); see also
Cerrato, 941 F. Supp. at 393.
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medical disorder outside of pregnancy.119 Unfortunately, no courts
provide definite guidance as to what factors determine a pregnancy's
normality. This elusive standard is problematic because it can change
from case to case. This problem is worsened when the "normality" of
a pregnancy, as defined by the courts, is entirely dependent on
advancing medical knowledge and technology.
E. Law of Mitigating Measures
The text of the ADA does not specify whether a disability
should be assessed with or without regard to corrective or mitigating
measures 120 in determining whether a plaintiffs major life activity is
substantially limited.121 The term "mitigating measures" refers to
anything that lessens or eliminates the effect of an impairment, and
includes, but is not limited to, medicines, assistive devices, and pros-
thetic devices.122 The decision whether to assess a disability and its
effect on the plaintiff with or without regard to mitigating measures
is an important one because many people are severely disabled
without the use of these corrective measures, but they can function
normally or nearly so with the use of mitigating measures.
The statute does not indictate whether mitigating measures
should be taken into account when determining whether a plaintiff is
disabled. Consequently, most courts have found the statute to be
119. See, e.g., Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 473 ("All of the physiological conditions and
changes related to a pregnancy also are not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or
are attributable to some disorder.").
120. This Note uses the term "mitigating measures" to refer to whether a major life activity
of the plaintiff is substantially limited by the physical/mental impairment in question. This is
somewhat confusing because the term "mitigating measures" is usually used in reference to the
plaintiff's general disability, not the more specific substantial limitation on the plaintiffs major
life activities (whether a plaintiff is "substantially limited" is a question to be answered under
the first prong of the definition of disability under the EEOC regulations). In fact, at least one
court has discussed mitigating measures in terms assessing both the plaintiffs physical im-
pairment and whether the physical impairment substantially limits one or more of the plaintiffs
major life activities. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899, 902 (10th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999). When this Note refers to mitigating measures, it is
for simplicity only and not because "mitigating measures" should be taken to qualify the term
"disability" as a physical impairment alone. The proper analysis is whether mitigating
measures should be considered when assessing whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in
one or more major life activities because of an established physical/mental impairment. See 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (discussing mitigating measures under the heading of the "substantially
limits" portion of the ADA's definitions). The mitigating measures do not eradicate the
disability. Therefore, the analysis should focus on whether the mitigating measures lessen the
effects of the disability such that the plaintiff is no longer substantially limited in one or more
major life activities.
121. See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464,467 (5th Cir. 1998).
122. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
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facially ambiguous. 13 As a result of this ambiguity, these courts have
turned to various sources to discern whether a disability under the
ADA should be assessed with or without regard to mitigating meas-
ures.124  Courts faced with this issue of statutory interpretation fre-
quently consult the EEOC regulations and Interpretive Guidance
first. 125 The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with exact-
ing compliance and promulgating regulations under the ADA.126 As a
result of this responsibility conferred by Congress, the EEOC's guide-
lines are entitled to a high degree of deference by courts. 27  The
EEOC Interpretive Guidance to the ADA states that "[t]he determina-
tion of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to miti-
123. See, e.g., Washington, 152 F.3d at 467; Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.,
136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858-59 (1st
Cir. 1998). But see Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I recognize that portions of the ADA's
vast legislative history lend some support to the EEOC's position. Where the statutory text is
unambiguous, however, as I believe it is here, that ends the matter.").
124. According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Chevron U.S-., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), only when a statute is silent or
ambiguous on a matter must a court defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute and
determine the permissibility of the agency's construction of the statute.
125. See, e.g., Washington, 152 F.3d at 468-69; Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937; Arnold, 136 F.3d
at 863-64; Sutton, 130 F.3d at 899; Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th
Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 902-05 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,879 (D. Kan. 1996); Schluter v. Industrial
Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (1994).
127. In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that when Congress has delegated express
"authority to [an] agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation," such
regulations "are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Chevron dictates another standard of
deference when Congress has implicitly delegated authority to an agency to interpret a statute.
In a case of implicit delegation, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provison [sic] for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id.
Although at first glance it appears that Congress has expressly delegated to the EEOC the
authority to interpret the ADA, it is actually an implicit delegation. While Congress expressly
gave the EEOC the power to interpret the ADA by way of regulation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12116,
there is no such express delegation for the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provisions. See
Recent Cases, Tenth Circuit Holds That Courts Should Consider Mitigating Measures in
Evaluating Disability-Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 111 HARV. L. REV. 2456, 2459 (1998).
Therefore, the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provisions should be interpreted by Chevron's
implicit delegation standard-whether the EEOC's interpretation of the use of mitigating
measures in the assessment of disabilities is a "reasonable" interpretation of the ADA. As
discussed below, most courts find the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on mitigating measures to
be unquestionably reasonable and extremely persuasive. See, e.g., Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937;
Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863-64; Harris, 102 F.3d at 521; Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 904-05; see also
Michael J. Puma, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting
the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 123, 140-41 (1998)
(discussing Chevron deference in relation to the EEOC guidelines and arguing for the increased
use of textualism in statutory interpretation).
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gating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic de-
vices."'m
Another source courts have consulted is the legislative history
of the ADA.129 The available legislative history indicates that
Congress intended disabilities under the ADA to be assessed without
regard to corrective measures. In a House Education and Labor
Committee Report discussing the first prong of the three-pronged
definition of disability under the ADA, the Committee Report ex-
plains:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be cor-
rected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments,
such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are
covered under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of
the impairment are controlled by medication. 3 0
Because the EEOC guidelines, as well as the ADA's legislative
history, strongly indicate that disabilities under the ADA should be
assessed without regard to mitigating measures, one would think that
most or all courts would hold the same. Some courts, however, disre-
gard the guidelines and the legislative history and assess disabilities
with regard to mitigating measures. Other courts follow the direction
of the EEOC and the ADA's legislative history and, accordingly, as-
sess disabilities without regard to mitigating measures.
128. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(j) (1998).
129. See, e.g., Washington, 152 F.3d at 467-68; Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937; Arnold, 136 F.3d
at 859-60; Harris, 102 F.3d at 521; Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 905. At least one court has also con-
sulted the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") interpretation of the ADA. The DOJ, charged with
enforcing the ADA's prohibition of discrimination based on disability on the part of state and
local governmental entities, interpreted the ADA to mean that disabilities should be assessed
without regard to mitigating measures. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (quoting 28 C.F.R. app. §
35.104(1994)).
130. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-AN. 303, 334. The
House Judiciary Committee Report indicates a similar understanding of the ADA's definition of
disability, stating that the "impairment should be assessed without considering whether
mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a
less-than-substantial limitation." H.R. REP. No. 101485(mH), at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report also
supports the determination that disabilities should be assessed without regard to corrective
measures: "[Wlhether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the avail-
ability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 23 (1989). It is interesting to note that the majority, if not all, of the courts to
consult the legislative history of the ADA have held that disabilities should be assessed without
regard to mitigating measures. Courts holding otherwise typically make no mention of the
legislative history of the ADA.
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1. Assessing Disabilities With Regard to Mitigating Measures
Despite the strong presumed deference to the EEOC's inter-
pretations and the ADA's legislative history, numerous courts have
held that disabilities should be assessed with regard to mitigating
measures.'3' The most recent of these cases, Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., involved twin sisters who filed suit against United
Airlines when it refused to hire the plaintiffs as pilots because of the
plaintiffs' level of uncorrected vision.13 2  The plaintiffs' uncorrected
vision in each eye fell below the minimum requirements set by United
for pilot visual acuity. 3  The plaintiffs filed suit under the ADA, al-
leging that the defendant discriminated against them because of their
disability of poor uncorrected vision.'3 The district court held that
the plaintiffs were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because their uncorrected vision did not substantially limit them in a
major life activity.135 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that their
disabilities of poor vision should be assessed without regard to
corrective measures (like glasses or contact lenses) in determining
whether the plaintiffs were substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing. 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim
and, in doing so, held that the plaintiffs' disabilities should be
assessed with regard to corrective measures. 3 7
In holding that the "determination of whether an individual's
impairment substantially limits a major life activity should take into
consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the indi-
131. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D.
Kan. 1996); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (W.D. Wis. 1996);
Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813-14 (N.D. Tex. 1994); see also Gilday v. Mecosta
County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 768 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ellison v.
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996). Commentators have urged this
result as well. See generally Harris, supra note 31 (arguing that controlled impairments should
not be considered disabilities under the ADA).
132. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895. See generally Carolyn V. Counce, Note, Corrective
Devices and Nearsightedness Under the ADA, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1195 (1998), for a detailed
discussion of visual impairments and mitigating measures under the ADA.
133. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 896 (discussing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL
588917, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996)).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 902. The Sutton court's holding has been criticized for its "circular reason-
ing" and lack of deference to the EEOC guidelines. See generally Recent Cases, supra note 127.
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vidual,"138 the Sutton court employed much of the reasoning used by
previous courts that have reached the same conclusion. First, the
Sutton court reasoned that section 1630.2(j) 139 of the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance directly conflicts with the plain language of the
ADA.140 The plain language of the ADA mandates that the court look
at whether a plaintiffs disability substantially limits one or more
major life activities of the plaintiff. The Sutton court stated that this
language commands a case-by-case analysis of whether a plaintiff is
substantially limited by a disability; the Interpretive Guidance, on the
other hand, asks the court to evaluate whether the plaintiffs
disability would "hypothetically affect the individual without the use
of corrective measures."4' The Sutton court further found that the
relevant part of section 1630.2(j) of the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance
was not only in conflict with the plain language of the ADA, but also
was internally inconsistent with other portions of the Interpretive
Guidance. 142 These findings allowed the court to reject the "mitigating
measures" portion of section 1630.20) and hold that the plaintiffs'
disabilities should be assessed with regard to corrective measures in
determining whether the plaintiffs were substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing.
The Sutton holding placed the plaintiffs in an odd position. As
the Sutton court stated:
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They are either disabled because their un-
corrected vision substantially restricts their major live [sic] activity of seeing
and, thus, they are not qualified individuals for a pilot position with United, or
they are qualified for the position because their vision is correctable and does
not substantially limit their major life activity of seeing.143
138. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
139. Section 1630.2(j) of the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states, in part, that "ftihe de-
termination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be
made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
140. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902. It is important to note that the only way the Sutton court
could justify going against the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA was for the court to find that
the EEOC guidelines were in direct conflict with the plain language of the ADA. See supra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
141. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902. A few commentators and courts have criticized the "no
mitigating measures" approach because it requires courts to evaluate the plaintiff in a hypo-
thetical non-medicated state. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 31, at 581-82.
142. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902. See also Arthur F. Silbergeld & Stacie S. Polashuk,
Chronic Serious Health Impairments and Worker Absences Under Federal Employment Laws, 14
LAB. LAW. 1, 18-20 (1998), for a critique of the EEOC guidelines.
143. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 903.
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Other courts have noted this predicament as well.'"
Interestingly, at least two of the cases which held that disabili-
ties should be assessed with regard to mitigating measures involved
plaintiffs that alleged disabilities directly related to the job qualifica-
tions of the position for which they were applying. In Sutton, the
plaintiffs applied for pilot positions that required uncorrected vision
of 20/100 or better.145 Similarly, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., the plaintiff was employed as a mechanic for the defendant,
United Parcel Service. As part of the qualifications for the job, the
defendant required the plaintiff to pass a physical with minimum
standards set by the Department of Transportation ("DOT"). Plaintiff
could not meet the minimum standards set for blood pressure
levels. 146 While the plaintiffs blood pressure was not directly related
to his job as a mechanic for the defendant, plaintiffs passing of the
physical was considered a requirement for employment. 47
144. See, e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 878 (D. Kan. 1996).
But see Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Department, 964 F. Supp. 898, 906-07 (E.D. Pa.
1997), in which the court held that the plaintiffs disability and its effect on his major life
activities should be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. In support of this holding,
the court noted:
Defendant argues on the one hand that plaintiffs myopia is not limiting or unusual as
compared with the general population, while arguing on the other hand that he does not
have the requisite visual capacity to be a state trooper due to his poor uncorrected vi-
sion. There is a certain irony inherent in defendants' argument: if, by virtue of his
glasses or lenses, plaintiff is not substantially limited in seeing, how can he nonetheless
be too visually impaired - based on his eyes without correction - to satisfy the position
of state trooper? Defendants' position may be intuitively attractive, in that most people
would not think of an individual as disabled if he can alleviate the effects of his impair-
ment by putting on eyeglasses, particularly as compared to an individual who, for in-
stance, is donfined to a wheelchair. However, intuition alone does not control this
Court's statutory interpretation; rather, I conclude, having considered the statutory lan-
guage, agency interpretations thereof, and existing legislative history, that the statutory
term "substantially limits" should not be interpreted to automatically exclude people
like plaintiff whose physical circumstances are limiting, but who use mitigating meas-
ures to offset the effects of their impairments.
Id. This is an interesting argument because it mirrors the argument made by the courts in
Sutton and Murphy. By approaching the issue from the plaintiff's perspective (placing the irony
of the argument on the defendant), the Wilson court held that plaintiffs visual impairment
should be assessed without regard to mitigating measures, the opposite conclusion reached by
the courts in Sutton and Murphy.
145. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
146. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 873.
147. See id. at 875. In Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., a case with facts similar to
those in Murphy, the plaintiff applied for the position of mechanic with United Parcel Service
and was required to pass a DOT physical. The plaintiff was an insulin-dependent diabetic,
however, and the DOT regulations precluded issuing a license to insulin-dependent diabetics.
In contrast to Murphy, the Arnold court held that plaintiffs disability (diabetes) should be
assessed without regard to mitigating measures (insulin) in determining whether the plaintiff
was substantially limited in one or more major life activities. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 907 (holding that the
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Murphy and Sutton can be distinguished from most other ADA
cases in which the plaintiff alleges a disability but the disability is not
directly related to the explicit job requirements. When the disability
directly affects an integral requirement of the job in question, courts
possibly judge the plaintiffs more harshly, disallowing the plaintiffs
from working at a job for which they can never be qualified because of
an inherent disability. Importantly, the Murphy and Sutton courts
are the same ones that commented that plaintiffs were trying to have
it "both ways" by claiming to have a disability that places them under
ADA protection, but also makes them unable to fulfill a fundamental
qualification for the job in question. 148
While all courts holding that disabilities should be assessed
with regard to corrective measures make some legal arguments as to
the EEOC's guidelines directly conflicting with the plain language of
the ADA,49 the driving rationale behind the courts' decisions is that
evaluating a disability without regard to mitigating measures reads
the "substantially limits" language out of the ADA.150 As one court
stated, "the EEOC interpretation requires that one not having a
limitation be considered as having a disability even though the statu-
tory language clearly requires substantial limitation."151 The courts
provide an enticing argument: One who is no longer substantially
limited because of corrective measures should not be considered dis-
abled under the ADA. As many of the courts on the opposite side of
the issue have noted, however, this approach may have problems as
well.
2. Assessing Disabilities Without Regard to Mitigating Measures
Many courts have held that disabilities under the ADA should
be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. 52 In reaching
court should not consider mitigating measures in assessing the plaintiff's visual impairment
even though the plaintiff had applied for the position of state trooper, a position requiring a
certain level of visual acuity).
148. Again, it must be noted that on very similar facts to Murphy, the court in Arnold
found that the plaintiffs disability should be assessed without regard to mitigating measures.
See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863.
149. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902; Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880; Schluter v. Industrial Coils,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813
(N.D. Tex. 1994).
150. See, e.g., Schluter, 928 F. Supp. at 1445; Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 813.
151. Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 813.
152. See, e.g., Washington v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998);
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy
& Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863; Doane v. City of
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this conclusion, these courts rely heavily on the EEOC guidelines,
backed up by the legislative history of the ADA. Both the EEOC
guidelines and the legislative history of the ADA seem to indicate that
disabilities under the ADA should be assessed without regard to
mitigating measures. 15 3 In addition to these sources, courts finding
that disabilities should be assessed without regard to corrective
measures often consider the statutory purpose of the ADA.YM These
courts reason that the underlying purpose of the ADA is to protect
individuals who in fact have an impairment, but are capable of per-
forming the job, with or without mitigating measures. 155 When look-
ing at the statutory purpose, the courts reason that "Congress not
only considered but actually intended that the ADA's protections
sweep broadly, covering a significant portion of the American popu-
lace."1s6
Despite the availability of the EEOC guidelines and legislative
history, some courts have held that disabilities should be assessed
without regard to mitigating measures without providing any ration-
ale for this approach. 57 These courts generally consult the numerous
sources already listed (the legislative history of the ADA, the EEOC
guidelines, and the statutory purpose), but simply conclude that they
should not take mitigating measures into consideration when assess-
ing a plaintiffs disability and its effect on her major life activities.5 8
At least one court, however, has taken a hybrid approach in
which some disabilities are assessed without regard to mitigating
measures, but other disabilities are assessed with regard to mitigat-
ing measures. In Washington v. HCA Health Services, Inc., the court
held that only serious impairments and ailments that are analogous
to those mentioned in the EEOC guidelines and the legislative
history--diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments-will be
considered in their unmitigated state. 159 The Washington court stated
that for impairments to be assessed without regard to mitigating
Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,
521 (11th Cir. 1996); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995); Wilson v.
Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
153. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861; see also Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 764
(6th Cir. 1997).
155. See, e.g.,Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861.
156. Id. at 862.
157. See, e.g., Baert, 149 F.3d at 629; Doane, 115 F.3d at 627-28; Holihan v. Lucky Stores,
Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Roth, 57 F.3d at 1454.
158. See, e.g., Arnold, 136 F.3d at 854. See generally Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
159. Washington v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 464,470-71 (5th Cir. 1998).
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measures, the plaintiff must use the mitigating measures on a regular
basis (like daily insulin shots). On the other hand, if the mitigating
measures are actually permanent corrections, the impairment will be
assessed with regard to the correction. 60
While the Washington court's approach generally follows the
EEOC guidelines and the legislative history of the ADA, this court
also found merit in the argument that disabilities should be assessed
with regard to mitigating measures. The court refused to make a
"broad pronouncement that all impairments must be considered in
their unmitigated state."161 The Washington court's analysis rep-
resents a new kind of analysis in which there is room for cases that do
not comfortably fit into either category. The court's decision allows
for a case-by-case analysis of any alleged disability which is not along
the lines of diabetes, epilepsy, or a hearing problem.
The main thrust behind the argument that disabilities under
the ADA should be assessed with regard to mitigating measures is
that there must come a point where the mitigating measures are so
successful as to render the plaintiff no longer substantially limited in
any major life activities. If so, then the ADA should afford no protec-
tion. The other side of the argument, however, has strong logical
reasoning as well. Primarily, courts promoting the assessment of
disabilities without regard to mitigating measures appear to implic-
itly contend that "[t]he EEOC's 'no mitigating measures' interpreta-
tion embodies the sensible position that the use of a prosthetic aid or
medication does not eliminate the underlying disability although it
may, as a practical matter, reduce or even eliminate its effects." 6 2
Beyond the support found in the EEOC guidelines and the
ADA's legislative history, strong policy reasons exist for adopting the
EEOC approach of assessing disabilities without regard to mitigating
measures. One of the policy considerations is that if a court were to
adopt the view that the plaintiffs disability and its effect on the
plaintiffs major life activities must be assessed with regard to
mitigating measures, the ADA would protect the plaintiff before
hiring provided that the plaintiff could not afford treatment for her
impairment, but not protect the employee once hired and treated
160. See id. The Washington court likely took the moderate approach because of its reluc-
tance to proceed with a full endorsement of the EEOC guidelines. The court stated that
"[although we think it is more reasonable to say that mitigating measures must be taken into
account, we recognize that our position is not so much more reasonable to warrant overruling
the EEOC." Id. at 470.
161. Id. at 471.
162. Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997).
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under the employer's health plan.163 Similarly, the ADA would not
protect a plaintiff suffering from a disease such as diabetes who
regularly took her medicine, while the ADA would protect the same
plaintiff who did not take or could not afford the medication.'"
Essentially, this rule would create a disincentive whereby plaintiffs
who cannot afford or just refuse to take advantage of mitigating
measures are rewarded with protection by the ADA.
Yet another facet of this policy consideration is that courts
should not punish plaintiffs for having taken the initiative to treat
any underlying disabilities. A plaintiff who is able to utilize medical
knowledge or technology to diminish the effects of her impairment,
even to the point that the employer may not need to provide reason-
able accommodations, should not then be left vulnerable to the em-
ployer's discrimination based on the plaintiffs underlying disability.
Denying ADA protection to plaintiffs who act independently to miti-
gate the effects of an impairment creates a disincentive to self-help. 165
Clearly, Congress would not want to discourage persons with disabili-
ties capable of being controlled from taking affirmative action to actu-
ally control the disabilities through whatever means available or
necessary.
Finally, as noted earlier,166 courts holding that disabilities
should be assessed with regard to mitigating measures place plaintiffs
in an odd position, forcing them to argue out of both sides of their
mouths. It was noted as early as 1991 that:
163. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 862. The defendant in Arnold pointed out that this result
would never occur because the plaintiff could always file an ADA suit based upon the third
prong of the disability definition, the "regarded as" disabled prong, instead of the first prong of
the definition of disability. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1998). The Arnold court
pointed out, however, that upon review of the legislative history, it was clear that Congress
intended plaintiffs with such controllable disabilities to be covered under the first prong, and
possibly the third prong as well. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 862. In fact, many plaintiffs
simultaneously file suit under both the first and third prongs of the definition of disability. See,
e.g., Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 936-38 (3d Cir. 1997); Harris v.
H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87
F.3d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 901,
909 (E.D. Pa. 1997). But see Harris, supra note 31, at 582-84, 590 (asserting that assessing a
disability without regard to mitigating measures lightens the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff
if the plaintiff proceeds under the first prong of the disability definition).
164. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 862. It must be noted, however, that most, if not all, courts
would hold that a plaintiff who knows about a disability and refuses to treat it will not be con-
sidered a suitable ADA plaintiff. See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 667
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when an employee knows about a disability, needs no accom-
modation from an employer, and fails to meet the employer's expectations because of a failure to
control a controllable disability, the plaintiff cannot state a cause of action under the ADA);
Harris, supra note 31, at 600-02 (discussing the policy problem of"malingerers").
165. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863 n.7.
166. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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[Tihe person alleging discrimination under the protected class approach may
be placed in a Catch-22 situation. The first task is to prove that he or she has
a condition that is a serious limitation-it substantially limits one or more
major life activities. If that hurdle is cleared, then the individual must turn
around and prove that the condition is not really a serious limitation in the
context of the particular job or opportunity at issue, i.e., that she or he is
"qualified."167
Essentially, this "catch-22" could conceivably allow an employer to
escape liability: If the plaintiff were not able to prove that she had a
serious impairment that substantially limited one or more major life
activities (because the court assessed the plaintiffs disability with
regard to mitigating measures), the plaintiff may never get an
opportunity to show that she is qualified for the position in question
with the help of mitigating measures. 168
The combination of the EEOC guidelines, the statutory pur-
pose behind the ADA, its legislative history, and the policy
considerations present in the issue of mitigating measures suggests
that there is a stronger argument to be made that a plaintiffs
disability under the ADA should be assessed without regard to
mitigating measures. 169
III. TECHNOLOGYAS A CORRECTIVE MEASURE
All mitigating measures ultimately stem from a technological
advancement of one type or another.170 Whether it be a crude leg
prosthesis or a complex drug formula, some form of technology had a
167. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 448
(1991).
168. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863.
169. Although unclear, it is possible that a sentiment expressed in dicta in the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Bragdon v. Abbott lends support to this proposition. Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). When discussing the fact that the H1V-positive
plaintiff may not ever want to have children, but that the plaintiffs major life activity of repro-
duction was nonetheless substantially limited, the court stated that "(iln the end, the disability
definition does not turn on personal choice." Id. at 2206. In the context of mitigating measures,
this quote could be interpreted as meaning that a person's choice to mitigate a physical/mental
impairment should not enter into the assessment of whether the person is substantially limited
in a major life activity.
170. When discussing technology in general, it is important to remember that "[t]echnology
is not simply the neutral product of rational technical imperatives; rather, it is the result of a
series of specific decisions made by particular groups of people in particular places at particular
times for their own purposes." Judy Wajcman, Delivered Into Men's Hands? The Social
Construction of Reproductive Technology, in POWER AND DECISION: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
REPRODUCTION 153, 154 (Gita Sen & Rachel C. Snow eds., 1994).
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large part in the development and usage of the mitigating measure.
Arguably, as technology advances to a point beyond current capabili-
ties, no more disabilities will exist because every imaginable im-
pairment would be "fixable" in one way or another. One commentator
has phrased this precise argument in the following terms:
If sometime in the future medical science progresses to the point that these
impairments are completely controlled by means that are themselves not sub-
stantially limiting, then these individuals would not be considered as having
disabilities under the first prong definition of disability. In the 1970s televi-
sion series, The Six Million Dollar Man, scientists rehabilitated a severely in-
jured astronaut with bionic prosthetic limbs, including two legs, one arm, and
a bionic prosthetic eye. The result is that the astronaut can run faster, see far-
ther, and lift more than any "normal" man. If and when we are able to create
the Six Million Dollar Man, he should not be deemed to have a disability under
the first prong definition of disability because he is not substantially limited
from any major life activity.171
This argument flows logically and appeals to common sense.
Yet, several problems arise with this proposition. First, if the discus-
sion is to focus on a hypothetical Six Million Dollar Man, it is not
inconceivable that this man might face discrimination based upon his
disabilities or "improvements." The author of the above quotation
would argue that this is why the third prong of the disability defini-
tion exists, so that those who are not actually disabled might still file
suit under the "regarded as" disabled prong. It is extremely difficult,
however, to argue convincingly that a person who is missing two legs,
an arm, and visual capacity is not "disabled" in any basic sense of the
word. Even if technology is able to somewhat compensate for these
losses or improve upon natural human abilities, the person is still
lacking a complete and natural human form. As such, this plaintiff
should be entitled to file suit under either the first prong of the dis-
ability definition, the third prong, or both.172
If technology can compensate for any disability, however, the
issue of whether a disability exists is rendered moot. Under this
approach, once the argument is posited that technology is a panacea
for any human impairment, then that same argument can be used to
justify the eradication of any and all disabilities. 73 The question then
171. Harris, supra note 31, at 599-600; see also DONNA HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND
WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 149-81 (1991) (promoting the idea of an inevitable
cyborg culture and the unique effects it might have upon gender).
172. See supra note 163.
173. The belief that technology can be a panacea is also called "technophilia." See NANCY
LUBLIN, PANDORA'S Box 23 (1998) ("Technophilia involves embracing technological innovation
itself, reverence for the ability to control and explain nature. Accordingly, all things mechanical
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becomes: what is a disability? As argued below, this question
necessitates that pregnancy-related problems, and all disabilities, be
assessed without regard to mitigating measures; for if they are not,
technology will dictate what society considers a disability simply by
what is correctable.
A. Technological Advances in Reproductive Medicine
Although the bodies of pregnancy discrimination law and miti-
gating measures law are quite distinct, they come together in an in-
teresting way. As technology advances at an ever-increasing rate,
various medical problems will be mitigated or extinguished by amelio-
rative measures. One area in which this technology is increasing at
an alarming rate is reproductive technology.174 Currently, technology
is available to allow conception outside of the human body, screen
embryos for various genetic deficiencies or predispositions, monitor a
pregnancy from the moment of conception, possibly pre-select various
characteristics for a to-be conceived embryo, and correct fetal deformi-
ties or problems before birth while the fetus is still in the womb.175
are due greater respect than all things natural because nature is imperfect, inefficient, and
untamed."); see also Patricia Bayer Richard, The Tailor-Made Child: Implications for Women
and the State, in EXPECTING TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL ABUSE & NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 9, 15-18 (Patricia Boling ed., 1995) (hypothesizing that advances in perinatal di-
agnostic and treatment technology will lead to the quest for a "perfect" fetus/baby).
174. Reproductive technology is a hotly contested issue. At least one group over the past
two decades has been dedicated solely to opposing reproductive technology: FINRRAGE
(Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering). See
LUBLIN, supra note 173, at 61-74 (discussing FINRRAGE); JUDY WAJCMAN, FEMINISM
CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY 58-60 (1991). See generally DION FARQUHAR, THE OTHER MACHINE:
DISCOURSE AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1996) (engaging in a thorough analysis of the
various discourses on reproductive technology); CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND
PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW FRAMEWORK (1997) (developing an ethical framework for thinking
about reproductive and perinatal technologies).
175. The treatment of fetuses within the womb is termed perinatology and has already
established itself as a necessary and important medical subdivision. Many medical textbooks
are dedicated wholly to reproductive medicine and perinatology. See generally NEW HORIzONS
IN REPRODUCTIvE MEDICINE: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE IX WORLD CONGRESS ON HUMAN
REPRODUCTION, PHILADELPHIA, 1996 (Christos Coutifaris & Luigi Mastroianni eds., 1997); see
also E. Albert Reece & Carol J. Homko, Embryoscopy, Fetal Therapy, and Ethical Implications,
57 ALB. L. REV. 709, 709 (1994) (discussing various prenatal diagnostic techniques and their
applications). The concept of diagnosing and treating a fetus while still in the womb raises
some very important concerns about women's autonomy and the status of a fetus. While it is
not the focus of this Note, it is important to recognize that there is a large body of scholarship
devoted to maternal-fetal conflicts. See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT 71-97 (1993)
(discussing reproductive technology and rights as they relate to personhood and "subject-ivity");
Bonnie Steinbock, Maternal-Fetal Conflict and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 781, 793
(1994) (arguing that "[riecognition of the fetus as a patient has the potential to impinge on
women's rights to privacy and autonomy"); Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and
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Although the array of reproductive technologies is immense, 176 this
Note is concerned only with the types of technologies that can be
termed "intervention" technologies: technologies that are used to
intervene in an already-existing pregnancy to fix a problem or compli-
cation with either the woman or fetus.7 7 This technology includes
amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, ultrasound, fetoscopy,
maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein testing, and fetal surgery.78 This
technology is relevant because it is the type of technology which might
alleviate pregnancy-related problems that would cause a woman to
miss work, need special accommodations from her employer, or per-
form at a level lower than that which is expected.
B. Reproductive Technology as It Relates to the ADA's
Definition of Disability
Currently, the ADA's definition of disability depends on the
effect the impairment has on a person's life, and does not hinge on the
advancement of technology. If the definition were read as mandating
the assessment of a disability with regard to mitigating measures, the
definition would become dependent on technology. This proposition is
the nexus between the two bodies of law.
One of the main reasons given by the courts and commentators
to support the idea that disabilities under the ADA should be as-
sessed with regard to mitigating measures is that the ADA is really
meant to protect only those who are truly affected by their disabili-
ties.179 At first glance, this argument appears incapable of being used
to support the opposite claim: that disabilities under the ADA should
be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. This is, however,
exactly the argument that needs to be made with regard to preg-
nancy-related problems. Imagine the following futuristic hypotheti-
the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1558-65 (1990) (discussing the history of the maternal versus
fetal rights debate).
176. See Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Legal Issues in Procreation, 8
LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 190, 192-93 (1996) (discussing available reproductive technologies to
assist in fertility and conception). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 175, at
1525-56, for an introduction to some of the reproductive technologies aimed at conception and
pregnancy.
177. See Developments in the Law, supra note 175, at 1557-58 (noting some of the then-
available fetal diagnostic and treatment technologies).
178. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 134-38, 141-44 (1995) (listing and defining the various
perinatal diagnostic and surgical technologies).
179. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D.
Wis. 1996); see also Harris, supra note 31, at 607-08.
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cal: An employed woman becomes pregnant. After the first trimester,
the woman submits to various testing that will determine whether
the fetus she is carrying is afflicted with any genetic disorders. The
woman learns that her fetus is male and it carries the gene for male
pattern baldness. After informing the woman of this genetic defect,
the doctors are quick to point out that the defect can be cured by a
simple procedure whereby the doctors operate in-utero on the fetus
and inject it with genetic material which will correct the male pattern
baldness problem before it even materializes (if it ever will). As a
result of this procedure, the woman will have to miss several days of
work, and when she does return to work, she will require a more
flexible schedule and lessened expectations of productivity because of
various after-effects of the procedure.
In such a situation, assessing any disability with regard to
mitigating measures would be catastrophic. This is where the ques-
tion "what is a disability?" becomes extremely important.180 In rela-
tion to the hypothetical posed, one would be hard-pressed to argue
that the woman suffered from any physical impairment since the
fetus' prospective male pattern baldness has absolutely no effect on
any of her major life activities. Although male pattern baldness can
be corrected in the womb (hypothetically), this should not be the de-
fining factor of whether the genetic anomaly, or the after-effects of the
procedure meant to correct it, should be considered a disability.
Moving away from the specifics of the hypothetical, the ques-
tion of "what is a disability?" is of the utmost importance.
Traditionally, the use of the word "disabled" was relegated to only
those who were visibly disfigured or truly incapacitated. This is no
longer the case. Now one can speak of disabilities ranging from predi-
lections for various unsavory characteristics to genetic anomalies that
may or may not ever develop into actual problems. This phenomenon
is directly related to technological advancement and technology's
ability to diagnose and correct. With greater genetic and medical
knowledge comes a wider array of those considered at risk, which in
turn leads to a greater need to diagnose and fix.181 As one author has
stated, "[als soon as technological artefacts and procedures have
reached a certain stage of development, their application usually
acquires a constructive character. They are then aimed not only at
180. See Richard, supra note 173, at 12-18, for a prediction of the frightening possibilities
that prenatal diagnosis and treatment might bring.
181. See id. at 14 (paraphrasing Andrea Bonnicksen, Genetic Diagnosis of Human Embryos,
22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1992, at S5, S7 (special supplement)).
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getting natural processes going or at interrupting them, but at re-
forming or completely redesigning whole natural systems."18 2
As assessing disabilities with regard to technology-based
mitigating measures makes advancing technology the linchpin of
disability analysis, the real issue should be whether a person is
actually and substantially limited by his or her physical/mental im-
pairment. This logic may seem confusing at first: The advocates of
the position that disabilities should be assessed with regard to miti-
gating measures argue that the real issue should always be whether
the person is actually affected by their disability. Yet, this is exactly
what this Note, advocating a no-mitigating measures approach, is
arguing. The reason for this confusion is simple. If one believes that
disabilities should always be assessed in their non-medicated,
unmitigated state, one is inherently drawn to the belief that the
underlying disability will always affect a person's life, no matter the
mitigating measures. On the other hand, if one believes that
disabilities should always be assessed in their medicated, mitigated
state, one is inherently drawn to the belief that technology-based
mitigating measures are capable of eliminating any negative effects of
an impairment so that the person may live a completely "normal" life.
There are two reasons why assessing disabilities without re-
gard to mitigating measures is the superior argument. First, the
advocates of assessing a disability with regard to mitigating measures
posit that to do otherwise would read the "substantially limits" lan-
guage out of the ADA statute.183 In other words, they argue that
technology-based mitigating measures are capable of eliminating a
person's mental/physical impairments to the point that no major life
activity could possibly be substantially limited. This argument,
however, contains a logical lacuna at some level: Disabilities should
be assessed with regard to mitigating measures, because if they are
not, the mental or physical impairment might produce an actual effect
on the plaintiffs life.'8 The problem with this reasoning is that the
conclusion that any effects of a disability can be eliminated by the use
of mitigating measures only follows if one assumes that mitigating
measures should be considered.185
182. KURT BAYERT-Z, GENETHICS: TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IN HUMAN
REPRODUCTION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 284 (Sarah L. Kirkby trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1994) (1987).
183. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.




Another key difference between the two sides in the mitigating
measures debate is the impact and results the two solutions are likely
to produce. The advocacy of assessing disabilities with regard to
mitigating measures carries one distinct risk that the other side does
not bear: the risk of the definition of disability hinging upon advanc-
ing technology and its ability to correct anything from critical disabili-
ties to minor nuisances.
As noted above,18 many courts have held that at least some
pregnancy-related problems should be considered disabilities under
the ADA. In doing so, several of these courts have held that the
proper standard for assessing whether a particular problem should be
considered a disability under the ADA should turn on whether the
problem results from a normal or abnormal pregnancy.187 These
courts place high faith in medical technology and its ability to discern
between the normal and abnormal. Without explicitly phrasing it in
those terms, it appears that these courts are holding that pregnancy-
related problems should be assessed with regard to technology-based
mitigating measures.'8 In other words, advances in medical
technology become the measuring stick by which normal/abnormal is
defined-that which technology can diagnose or "fix" is regarded as
abnormal. In this way, the two bodies of law (pregnancy-related
problems and mitigating measures) may have already merged to some
extent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ADA law of pregnancy-related problems and mitigating
measures can be viewed as distinctly developing areas of the law.
Currently, both areas of law are in a state of flux, with courts deciding
cases on all sides of the issue. When these two areas of law are
viewed together, however, a fuller understanding develops.
Clearly, some pregnancy-related problems must be severe
enough to be considered disabilities under the ADA. While these
severe problems are arguably not the result of a "normal" pregnancy,
medical advances and distinctions between normality and abnormal-
ity should not be the foundation upon which this analysis rests.
186. See supra Part II.D.3.
187. See supra notes 100-104, 118-119 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-82 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Cerrato
v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388,392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Instead, courts should look to whether a particular plaintiff suffered
from a pregnancy-related problem severe enough to impinge upon her
daily activities in a substantial manner. One does not need to look to
standards of a "normal" pregnancy to determine if a woman is af-
flicted by a particularly difficult pregnancy that is causing her great
pain and trauma. Similarly, with regard to mitigating measures, the
standard should be the effect the unmitigated disability has on the
person's daily life, albeit hypothetically. To assess a disability with
regard to mitigating measures is to allow civil rights for disabled
persons to hinge upon the rate and level of the advancement of tech-
nology.
Pregnancy-related problems and reproductive technology pro-
vide a special window into the mitigating measures debate. As repro-
ductive technology is advancing as quickly or more quickly than other
areas of technology, it is a useful tool in analyzing the mitigating
measures debate. As perinatal diagnostic and treatment technology
further develops, it becomes easier and easier to diagnose minor
problems or anomalies in a fetus or pregnancy. The newfound ease of
diagnosis will undoubtedly lead to more high-tech solutions for treat-
ment of pregnancy-related problems. Almost inevitably, it will seem
logical that if the fetus or pregnancy is not "perfect" and there is tech-
nology available which will cure any "defects," the defect must be
considered a disability of sorts. The problem arises, however, when
disabilities become defined as minor glitches in someone's genetic
makeup, predilections for a particular lifestyle, or particular un-
wanted characteristics. It is because of this specter that technology-
based mitigating measures cannot function as the standard by which
disabilities are defined. Instead, disabilities must be assessed in their
unmitigated state. While pills, crutches, glasses, prostheses, and
surgical procedures may better the lives of some persons faced with
severe disabilities so that they may function at a near-normal or nor-
mal level, the disability always remains and will always have some
staying effect on the person. If these people ever face discrimination
based upon this disability, they should not be punished for either
their own affirmative acts of self-help or the relentless progression of
technology.
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